The Valley Campaign was Confederate Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's brilliant spring 1862 campaign through the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia during the American Civil War. Employing audacity and lightning movements, Jackson's 17,000 men won several minor battles and successfully engaged three Union armies (over 60,000 men), preventing them from reinforcing the Union offensive against Richmond.
BackgroundIn the spring of 1862 "Southern morale ... was at its nadir"[1] and "prospects for the Confederacy's survival seemed bleak."[2] Following the successful summer of 1861, particularly the First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas), its prospects declined quickly. Union armies in the Western Theater, under Ulysses S. Grant and others, captured Southern territory and won significant battles at Fort Donelson and Shiloh. And in the East, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's massive Army of the Potomac was approaching Richmond from the southeast in the Peninsula Campaign, Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's large corps was poised to hit Richmond from the north, and Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks's army was threatening the Shenandoah Valley. However, Jackson's Confederate "troops were in excellent spirits"[3], laying the foundation for his performance in the Valley that spring, which helped derail the Union plans and re-energize Confederate morale elsewhere. Initial movementsIn November 1861, Jackson commanded the Valley District, with his headquarters at Winchester. Jackson, recently a professor at Virginia Military Institute and suddenly a hero at First Manassas, was familiar with the valley terrain, having lived there for many years. His command included the Stonewall Brigade and a variety of militia units. In December, Jackson was reinforced by Brig. Gen. William W. Loring and 6,000 troops, but his combined force was insufficient for offensive operations. While Banks remained north of the Potomac River, Jackson's cavalry commander, Col. Turner Ashby, raided the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Jackson fought inconclusively with two small union posts at Romney and Bath. Banks reacted by crossing the Potomac in late February and moving south to protect the canal and railroad from Ashby. Jackson's command was operating as the left wing of Joseph E. Johnston's army, and when Johnston moved from Manassas to Culpeper in March, Jackson's position at Winchester was isolated. On March 12, 1862, Banks continued his advance to the southwest ("up the Valley") and occupied Winchester. Jackson had withdrawn up the Valley Pike to Strasburg. Banks's orders, as part of the overall strategy for the Peninsula Campaign, were to move farther south and drive Jackson from the Valley. After accomplishing this, he was to withdraw to a position nearer Washington, D.C. A strong advance force under Brig. Gen. James Shields began the movement south from Winchester on March 17, while McClellan began his amphibious movement to the Virginia Peninsula. Jackson's orders from Johnston were to avoid general combat because he was outnumbered, but at the same time he was to keep Banks occupied to prevent the detachment of troops to reinforce McClellan on the Peninsula. As Shields advanced on Strasburg, Jackson withdrew to Mount Jackson, leaving behind a cavalry screen. The Union cavalry erroneously reported to Shields that Jackson had fled from the Valley. Banks concluded that the first part of his mission—to eject Jackson from the Valley—had been accomplished, and he proceeded to move east, back to the vicinity of Washington. Jackson was dismayed at this movement because Banks was doing what Jackson had been directed to prevent. On March 22, Ashby's cavalry skirmished with outposts that Shields had left at Kernstown, just south of Winchester, and reported to Jackson that there was only a weak union force in the area, fewer than four regiments. In actuality, Shields's force was a full infantry division of almost 9,000 men, much stronger than Jackson's 3,400. Battles
Following Jackson's victory at McDowell, there was a two-week lull in combat while forces repositioned and Jackson tried to determine the best way to prevent Banks from leaving the Valley and reinforcing Irvin McDowell or McClellan. Robert E. Lee, military advisor to Jefferson Davis, caused some command confusion by communicating directly with Ewell, bypassing Jackson and Johnston (the overall commander in the theater), and urging him to attack Banks's line of communication. Ewell's orders from Jackson had been to take up a position at Swift Run Gap and counter any advance by Banks. While this disagreement was being worked out, Banks sent Shields and his division to reinforce Irvin McDowell's forces at Fredericksburg, leaving Banks only 8,000 troops, which he relocated to a strong position at Strasburg, Virginia. He detached about 1,000 men under Col. John R. Kenly to Front Royal to watch for a potential Confederate attack in the Luray Valley. Johnston ordered Ewell to leave the Valley to react to Shields's departure, but a combination of Jackson and Lee convinced him that a potential victory in the Valley had more immediate importance than countering Shields. On May 21, Jackson marched his command east from New Market, combining with Ewell, and proceeded (northward) down the Luray Valley. Their speed of forced marching was typical of the campaign and earned his infantrymen the nickname of "Jackson's foot cavalry". He sent Ashby's cavalry directly north to make Banks think that he was going to attack Strasburg, but his plan was to defeat Kenly's small outpost at Front Royal and quickly attack Banks's line of communication at Harpers Ferry.
The Washington politicians, reacting to Banks's ejection from the Valley, made a fatal mistake. Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton decided that the defeat of Jackson was an immediate priority (even though Jackson's orders were solely to keep Union forces occupied away from Richmond). They ordered Irvin McDowell to send 20,000 men (under Shields and Maj. Gen. Edward Ord) to Front Royal and Frémont to move to Harrisonburg. If both forces could converge at Strasburg, Jackson's only escape route up the Valley would be cut. The immediate repercussion of this move was to abort McDowell's coordinated attack with McClellan on Richmond. On May 30, Jackson left the Stonewall Brigade to keep Banks in check north of the Potomac, while he withdrew from Harpers Ferry. Although both Shields and Frémont were closer to Strasburg than Jackson, they proceeded slowly. Shields recaptured Front Royal from a small Confederate force and then dawdled without explicit orders; Frémont was delayed by Ashby's cavalry and did not press forward vigorously; both were delayed by poor roads, while Jackson's troops had the use of the Valley Pike. Jackson was able to escape Strasburg on June 1 before the Union forces could trap him. On June 2, Union forces pursued Jackson—McDowell up the Luray Valley and Frémont up the Valley Pike. Banks crossed the Potomac and followed. For the next five days, frequent clashes occurred between Turner Ashby's cavalry (screening the rear of Jackson's march) and lead Union cavalry. A single Union cavalry brigade reached the rear guard of Jackson's column and routed it, but Ashby rallied up some survivors and held the guard back. He also burned some bridges across the South Fork of the Shenandoah River, delaying the Union pursuit and keeping Shields's and Frémont's forces separated. When contact was reestablished on June 6, Ashby was killed on Chestnut Ridge near Harrisonburg in a skirmish with Frémont. This was a significant loss for the Confederacy since Ashby (the "Black Knight") was one of its most promising cavalry generals. Jackson's army took up defensive positions in Cross Keys and Port Republic, where the final battles would be fought over two days. On June 8, a raid by Shields's cavalry on Port Republic almost captured the Confederate trains and Jackson himself.
AftermathAfter Jackson's victories at Cross Keys and Port Republic, the Union forces were withdrawn. Jackson joined Lee on the Virginia Peninsula for the Seven Days Battles (where he delivered an uncharacteristically lethargic performance, perhaps because of the strains of the Valley Campaign). He had accomplished his mission, withholding over 50,000 needed troops from McClellan (who felt that the Confederate Army outnumbered him, although the entire Army of Northern Virginia had about 60,000, including Jackson). With the success of his Valley Campaign, Stonewall Jackson became the most celebrated soldier in the Confederacy (until he was eventually eclipsed by Lee), and his victories lifted the morale of the public. In a classic military campaign of surprise and maneuver, he pressed his army to travel 646 miles (1,040 km) in 48 days of marching and won five significant victories with a force of about 17,000 against a combined force of 60,000. On the Union side, a command shakeup resulted from the embarrassing defeat by a smaller force. McDowell's corps remained in the Valley, with only one division (under George A. McCall) able to join McClellan on the Peninsula. Lincoln was disillusioned by the command difficulties of controlling multiple forces in this campaign and created a single new army, the Army of Virginia, under Maj. Gen. John Pope, incorporating the units of Banks, Frémont, McDowell, and several smaller ones from around Washington and western Virginia. This army was soundly defeated by Lee and Jackson in the Northern Virginia Campaign and the Second Battle of Bull Run. References
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