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Background
Mongol Empire
Tibet was once a strong power contemporaneous with the Chinese Tang Dynasty (618–907). Until the Tibetan Empire's collapse in the 9th century, it was the Tang's major rival in dominating Inner Asia.[3][4] The Yarlung rulers of Tibet also signed various peace treaties with the Tang, culminating in a treaty in 821 that fixed the borders between Tibet and Tang China.[5] During the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Period (907–960) in China, while the fractured political realm of China saw no threat in a Tibet which was in just as much political disarray, there was little in the way of Sino-Tibetan relations.[6][7] Few documents involving Sino-Tibetan contacts survive from the Song Dynasty (960–1279).[8][7] The Song were far more concerned with countering northern enemy states of the Khitan-ruled Liao Dynasty (907–1125) and Jurchen-ruled Jin Dynasty (1115–1234).[8]
In 1207, the Mongol ruler Genghis Khan (r. 1206–1227) conquered and subjugated the ethnic Tangut state of the Western Xia (1038–1227).[9] In the same year, he established diplomatic relations with Tibet by sending envoys there.[10] The recent conquest of the Western Xia alarmed Tibetan rulers, who then decided to pay tribute to the Mongols.[9] However, when they ceased to pay tribute after Genghis Khan's death, his successor Ögedei Khan (r. 1229–1241) launched an invasion into Tibet.[11] The Mongol Prince Godan, a grandson of Genghis Khan, raided as far as Lhasa.[12][9] During his attack in 1240, Godan summoned Sakya Pandita (1182–1251), leader of the Sakya Tibetan Buddhist sect, to his court in what is now Gansu province in Western China.[12][9] With Sakya Pandita's submission to Godan in 1247, Tibet was officially incorporated into the Mongol Empire during the regency of Töregene Khatun (1241–1246).[12][13] Michael C. van Walt van Praag writes that Godan granted Sakya Pandita temporal authority over a still politically fragmented Tibet, stating that "this investiture had little real impact" but it was significant in that it established the unique "Priest-Patron" relationship between the Mongols and Tibetan Sakya lamas.[9]
Since 1236, the Mongol prince Kublai (who later ruled as Khagan from 1260–1294) was granted a large appanage in North China by his superior Ögedei Khan.[14] Karma Pakshi (1203–1283)—the head lama and second Karmapa of the Tibetan Black Hat sect—rejected the invitation of Kublai to appear in his court, so instead Kublai invited Drogön Chögyal Phagpa (1235–1280), successor and nephew of Sakya Pandita, who came to his court in 1253.[15][16][17] Kublai instituted a unique relationship with the Phagpa lama, which recognized Kublai as a superior sovereign in political affairs and the Phagpa lama as the senior instructor to Kublai in religious affairs.[15][18][17] Kublai also made Drogön Chögyal Phagpa the ruling priest-king of Tibet, which comprised thirteen different states ruled by myriarchies.[18][19][17]
Kublai Khan did not conquer the Song Dynasty of China until 1279, so Tibet was a component of the early Mongol Empire before it was combined into a larger empire with the whole of China under the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368).[17] Van Praag writes that this conquest "marked the end of independent China," which was then incorporated into the Yuan Dynasty that ruled China, Tibet, Mongolia, parts of Korea, Siberia, and Upper Burma.[20]
Overthrow of the Sakya and Yuan
In 1358, the Sakya viceregal regime installed by the Mongols in Tibet was overthrown in a rebellion by the Phagmodru myriarch Janchub Gyaltsän, or Byang chub rgyal mtshan (1302–1364).[21][22][20] The Mongol Yuan court was forced to accept him as the new viceroy, and Janchub Gyaltsän and his Phagmodru successors gained de facto rule over Tibet.[21][22][20] In 1368, a Han Chinese revolt known as the Red Turban Rebellion toppled the Mongol Yuan Dynasty in China. Zhu Yuanzhang then established the Ming Dynasty, ruling as the Hongwu Emperor (r. 1368–1398).[23]
It is not clear how much the early Ming court understood the civil war going on in Tibet between rival religious sects, but the first emperor was anxious to avoid the same trouble that Tibet had caused for the Tang Dynasty.[21][24] Instead of recognizing the Phagmodru ruler, the Hongwu Emperor sided with the Karmapa of the nearer Kham region and southeastern Tibet, sending envoys out in the winter of 1372–1373 to ask the Yuan officeholders to renew their titles for the new Ming court.[21] As evident in his imperial edicts, Hongwu was well aware of the Buddhist link between Tibet and China, and wanted to foster it.[25][26] The fourth Karmapa Rolpe Dorje (1340–1383) rejected Hongwu's invitation, although he did send some disciples as envoys to the Ming court in Nanjing.[21] Hongwu also entrusted his guru Zongluo, one of many Buddhist monks at court, to head a religious mission into Tibet in 1378–1382 in order to obtain Buddhist scriptures.[25][26] However, the early Ming government enacted a law, later rescinded, which forbade Han Chinese to learn the tenets of Tibetan Buddhism.[27] There is little detailed evidence of Chinese—especially lay Chinese—studying Tibetan Buddhism until the Republican era (1912–1949). [27] Despite these missions on behalf of Hongwu, Morris Rossabi writes that the Yongle Emperor (r. 1402–1424) "was the first Ming ruler actively to seek an extension of relations with Tibet."[28]
Assertions in the Mingshi
According to the official historical work on the Ming Dynasty, the History of Ming (or Mingshi in Chinese), compiled in 1739 by the subsequent Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), the Ming Dynasty established the "E-Li-Si Army-Civilian Marshal Office"[a] in western Tibet and installed the "Dbus-Gtsang Itinerant High Commandery"[b] and "Mdo-khams Itinerant High Commandery"[c] to administer eastern Tibet.[30][31] The Mingshi states that administrative offices were set up under these high commanderies, including one Itinerant Commandery,[d] three Pacification Commissioner's Offices,[e] six Expedition Commissioner's Offices,[f] four Wanhu offices (myriarchies each in command of 10,000 households),[g] and seventeen Qianhu offices (chiliarchies each in command of 1,000 households).[h][32]
The Ming court appointed three Princes of Dharma (法王) and five Princes (王), and granted many other titles, such as Grand State Tutors (大國師) and State Tutors (國師), to the important schools of Tibetan Buddhism, including the Karma Kagyu sect, Sakya sect, and Gelug sect.[33] According to Wang Jiawei and Nyima Gyaincain, leading officials of these organs were all appointed by the central government and were subject to the rule of law.[34] Yet Van Praag describes the distinct and long-lasting Tibetan law code established by the Phagmodru ruler Janchub Gyaltsän as one of many reforms to revive old Imperial Tibetan traditions.[35]
The late Turrell V. Wylie, a former professor of the University of Washington, and Li Tieh-tseng argue that the reliability of the heavily censored Mingshi as a credible source on Sino-Tibetan relations is questionable, in the light of modern scholarship.[36] Other historians also assert that these Ming titles were nominal and did not actually confer the authority that the earlier Yuan titles had.[37][38] Van Praag writes that the "numerous economically motivated Tibetan missions to the Ming Court are referred to as 'tributary missions' in the Ming Shih."[39] Van Praag writes that these "tributary missions" were simply prompted by China's need for horses from Tibet, since a viable horse market in Mongol lands was closed due to incessant conflict.[39]
Modern scholarly debates
Inheritance, reappointments, and titles
Transition from Yuan to Ming
Historians disagree on what the relationship was between the Ming court and Tibet and whether or not Ming China had sovereignty over Tibet. Van Praag writes that Chinese court historians viewed Tibet as an independent foreign tributary and had little interest in Tibet besides a lama-patron relationship.[40][41] The historian Xagabba Wangqug Dedain supports van Praag's position.[40] However, Wang Jiawei and Nyima Gyaincain state that these assertions by van Praag and Xagabba are "fallacies".[40]
Wang and Nyima argue that the Ming emperor sent edicts to Tibet twice in the second year of the Ming Dynasty, and demonstrated that he viewed Tibet as a significant region to pacify by urging various Tibetan tribes to submit to the authority of the Ming court.[42] They note that at the same time, the Mongol Prince Punala, who had inherited his position as ruler of areas of Tibet, went to Nanjing in 1371 to pay tribute and show his allegiance to the Ming court, bringing with him the seal of authority issued by the Yuan court.[43] They also state that since successors of lamas granted the title of "prince" had to travel to the Ming court to renew this title, and since lamas called themselves princes, the Ming court therefore had "full sovereignty over Tibet."[44] They state that the Ming Dynasty, by issuing imperial edicts to invite ex-Yuan officials to the court for official positions in the early years of its founding, won submission from ex-Yuan religious and administrative leaders in the Tibetan areas, and thereby incorporated Tibetan areas into the rule of the Ming court. Thus, they conclude, the Ming court won the power to rule Tibetan areas formerly under the rule of the Yuan Dynasty.[44]
Journalist and author Thomas Laird, in his book The Story of Tibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama, writes that Wang and Nyima present the government viewpoint of the People's Republic of China in their Historical Status of China's Tibet, and fail to realize that China was "absorbed into a larger, non-Chinese political unit" during the Mongol Yuan Dynasty, which Wang and Nyima paint as a characteristic Chinese dynasty succeeded by the Ming.[45] Laird asserts that the ruling Mongol khans never administered Tibet as part of China and instead ruled them as separate territories, comparing the Mongols with the British who colonized India and New Zealand, yet stating this does not make India part of New Zealand as a consequence.[46] Of later Mongol and Tibetan accounts interpreting the Mongol conquest of Tibet, Laird asserts that "they, like all non-Chinese historical narratives, never portray the Mongol subjugation of Tibet as a Chinese one."[46]
The Columbia Encyclopedia distinguishes between the Yuan Dynasty and the other Mongol Empire khanates of Ilkhanate, Chagatai Khanate and the Golden Horde. It describes the Yuan Dynasty as "A Mongol dynasty of China that ruled from 1271 to 1368, and a division of the great empire conquered by the Mongols. Founded by Kublai Khan, who adopted the Chinese dynastic name of Yüan in 1271."[48] The Encyclopedia Americana described the Yuan Dynasty as "the line of Mongol rulers in China" and the Mongols "proclaimed a Chinese-style Yüan dynasty at Khanbaliq (Beijing)."[49] The Metropolitan Museum of Art writes that the Mongol rulers of the Yuan Dynasty "adopted Chinese political and cultural models; ruling from their capitals in Dadu, they assumed the role of Chinese emperors,"[50] although Tibetologist Thomas Laird dismissed the Yuan Dynasty as a non-Chinese polity and plays down its Chinese characteristics. The Metropolitan Museum of Art also noted that in spite of the gradual assimilation of Yuan monarchs, the Mongol rulers imposed harsh policies discriminating against the literati and southern Chinese.[50] Morris Rossabi, a professor of Asian history at Queens College, City University of New York, describes in his Kublai Khan: His Life and Times the Yuan's institution of an ethno-geographic caste hierarchy favoring the Mongols and other ethnicities and discriminating against the Han Chinese majority, while at the same time abolishing the imperial examinations of China's civil service legacy.[51] Rossabi writes that Kublai reluctantly had to employ Chinese advisors at court, but at the same time had to "maintain a delicate balancing act" in ruling his sedentary Chinese subjects and "preserving the cultural identity and values of the Mongols."[52] Although it was a necessity for Kublai to show concern for his Chinese subjects, at the same time he exploited China's resources for his own gain, while "his motivations and objectives alternated from one to the other throughout his reign," according to Rossabi.[53] Van Praag writes in The Status of Tibet that the Tibetans and Mongols, on the other hand, upheld a dual system of rule and an interdependent relationship that legitimated the succession of Mongol khans as universal Buddhist rulers, or chakravartin.[17] Van Praag writes that "Tibet remained a unique part of the Empire and was never fully integrated into it," citing examples such as a licensed border market that existed between China and Tibet during the Yuan.[17]
Ming practices of giving titles to Tibetans
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, the Ming implemented a policy of managing Tibet according to conventions and customs, granting titles and setting up administrative organs over Tibet.[54] The Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China states that the Ming Dynasty's Ü-Tsang Commanding Office governed most areas of Tibet.[1] It also states that while the Ming abolished the policy council set up by the Mongol Yuan to manage local affairs in Tibet and the Mongol system of Imperial Tutors to govern religious affairs, the Ming adopted a policy of bestowing titles upon religious leaders who had submitted to the Ming Dynasty.[1] For example, an edict of the Hongwu Emperor in 1373 appointed the Tibetan leader Choskunskyabs as the General of the mNgav-ris Military and Civil Wanhu Office, stating:[55]
I, the sovereign of the Empire, courteously treat people from all corners of the Empire who love righteousness and pledge allegiance to the Court and assign them official posts. I have learned with great pleasure that you, Chos-kun-skyabs, who live in the Western Region, inspired by my power and reputation, are loyal to the Court and capable of safeguarding the territory in your charge. The mNgav-ris Military and Civil Wanhu Office has just been established. I, therefore, appoint you head of the office with the title of General Huaiyuan, believing that you are most qualified for the post. I expect you to be even more conscientious in your work than in the past, to comply with discipline and to care for your men so that security and peace in your region can be guaranteed.[55]
Chen Qingying, Professor of History and Director of the History Studies Institute under the China Tibetology Research Center in Beijing, writes that the Ming court conferred new official positions on ex-Yuan Tibetan leaders of the Phachu Kargyu and granted them lower-ranking positions.[56] Of the county (zong or dzong) leaders of Neiwo Zong and Renbam Zong, Chen states that when "the Emperor learned the actual situation of the Phachu Kargyu, the Ming court then appointed the main Zong leaders to be senior officers of the Senior Command of Dbus and Gtsang."[56] The official posts that the Ming court established in Tibet, such as senior and junior commanders, offices of Qianhu (in charge of 1,000 households), and offices of Wanhu (in charge of 10,000 households), were all hereditary positions according to Chen, but he asserts that "the succession of some important posts still had to be approved by the emperor," while old imperial mandates had to be returned to the Ming court for renewal.[56]
According to Tibetologist John Powers, Tibetan sources counter this narrative of titles granted by the Chinese to Tibetans, with various titles which the Tibetans gave to the Chinese emperors and their officials. Tribute missions from Tibetan monasteries to the Chinese court brought back not only titles, but large, commercially valuable gifts which could subsequently be sold. The Ming emperors sent invitations to ruling lamas, but the lamas sent subordinates rather than coming themselves, and no Tibetan ruler ever explicitly accepted the role of being a vassal of the Ming.[57] Also, Hans Bielenstein writes that as far back as the Han Dynasty (202 BC – 220 AD), the Han Chinese government "maintained the fiction" that the foreign officials administering the various "Dependent States" and oasis city-states of the Western Regions (composed of the Tarim Basin and oasis of Turfan) were true Han representatives due to the Han government's conferral of Chinese seals and seal cords to them.[58]
Janchub Gyaltsän
Wang and Nyima state that after the official title "Education Minister" was granted to Janchub Gyaltsän (Byang chub rgyal mtshan, 1302–1364) by the Yuan court, this title appeared frequently with his name in various Tibetan texts, while his Tibetan title "Degsi" is seldom mentioned.[59] Wang and Nyima take this to mean that "even in the later period of the Yuan Dynasty, the Yuan imperial court and the Pagmo Drupa regime maintained a Central-local government relation."[59] Janchub Gyaltsän is even supposed to have written in his will: "In the past I received loving care from the emperor in the east. If the emperor continues to care for us, please follow his edicts and the imperial envoy should be well received."[59]
However, Lok-Ham Chan, a professor of history at the University of Washington, writes that Janchub Gyaltsän's aims were to recreate the old Tibetan Kingdom that existed during the Chinese Tang Dynasty, to build "nationalist sentiment" amongst Tibetans, and to "remove all traces of Mongol suzerainty."[21] Georges Dreyfus, a professor of religion at Williams College, writes that it was Janchub Gyaltsän who adopted the old administrative system of Songtsän Gampo (c. 605–649)—the first Yarlung king to establish Tibet as a strong power—by reinstating its legal code of punishments and administrative units.[60] For example, instead of the 13 governorships established by the Mongol Sakya viceroy, Janchub Gyaltsän divided Central Tibet into districts (dzong) with district heads (dzong dpon) who had to conform to old rituals and wear clothing styles of old Imperial Tibet.[60] Van Praag asserts that Janchub Gyaltsän's ambitions were to "restore to Tibet the glories of its Imperial Age" by reinstating secular administration, promoting "national culture and traditions," and installing a law code that survived into the 20th century.[35]
According to Chen, the Ming officer of Hezhou (modern day Linxia) informed the Hongwu Emperor that the general situation in Dbus and Gtsang "was under control," and so he suggested to the emperor that he offer the second Phagmodru ruler Shakya Gyaltsen (Wylie: sh'akya rgyal mtshan; ZWPY: Sagya Gyaincain) an official title.[61] According to the Records of the Founding Emperor, Hongwu issued an edict granting the title "Initiation State Master" to Sagya Gyaincain, while the latter sent envoys to the Ming court to hand over his jade seal of authority along with tribute of colored silk and satin, statues of the Buddha, Buddhist scriptures, and sarira.[61]
Dreyfus writes that after the Phagmodru myriarchy lost its centralizing power over Tibet in 1434, several attempts by other families to establish hegemonies failed over the next two centuries until 1642 with Lozang Gyatso, the Fifth Dalai Lama's effective hegemony over Tibet.[60]
Je Tsongkhapa
The Ming Dynasty granted titles to sects such as the Black Hat Karmapa lamas, but the latter had previously declined Mongol invitations to receive titles.[62] When the Ming Yongle Emperor invited Je Tsongkhapa (1357–1419), founder of the Yellow Hat sect, to come to the Ming court and pay tribute, the latter declined.[62] Wang and Nyima write that this was due to old age and physical weakness, and also because of efforts being made to build three major monasteries.[63] Chen Qingying states that Tsongkhapa wrote a letter to decline the Emperor's invitation, and in this reply, Tsongkhapa wrote:[64]
It is not that I don't know it is the edict of the Great dominator of the world for the sake of Buddhist doctrine, or that I do not obey the edict of Your Majesty. I am seriously ill whenever I meet the public, so I cannot embark on a journey in compliance with the imperial edict. I wish that Your Majesty might be merciful, and not be displeased; it will really be a great mercy. [64]
Tom Grunfeld, Professor of History at Empire State College of the State University of New York, says that Tsongkhapa claimed ill health in his refusal to appear at the Ming court,[65] while Rossabi adds that Tsongkhapa cited the "length and arduousness of the journey" to China as another reason not to make an appearance.[66] This first request by the Ming was made in 1407, but the Ming court sent another embassy in 1413, this one led by the eunuch Hou Xian (候顯; fl. 1403–1427), which was again refused by Tsongkhapa.[66] Rossabi writes that Tsongkhapa did not want to entirely alienate the Ming court, so he sent his disciple Chosrje Shākya Yeshes (Jamchen Choje, 釋迦也失) to Nanjing in 1414 on his behalf, and upon his arrival in 1415 the Yongle Emperor bestowed upon him the title of "State Teacher"—the same title earlier awarded the Phagmodru ruler of Tibet.[62][65][66] The Xuande Emperor (r. 1425–1435) even granted this disciple Chosrje Shākya Yeshes the title of a "King" (王).[62] This title does not appear to have held any practical meaning, or to have given its holder any power, at Tsongkhapa's Ganden monastery. Wylie notes that this—like the Black Hat sect—cannot be seen as a reappointment of Mongol Yuan offices, since the Yellow Hat sect was created after the fall of the Yuan Dynasty.[62]
Implications on the question of rule
Dawa Norbu, a leading author of the Tibetan diaspora, argues that modern Chinese Communist historians tend to be in favor of the view that the Ming simply reappointed old Yuan Dynasty officials in Tibet and perpetuated their rule of Tibet in this manner.[67] Norbu writes that, although this would have been true for the eastern Tibetan regions of Amdo and Kham's "tribute-cum-trade" relations with the Ming, it was untrue if applied to the western Tibetan regions of Ü-Tsang and Ngari. After the Phagmodru myriarch Janchub Gyaltsän, these were ruled by "three successive nationalistic regimes," which Norbu writes "Communist historians prefer to ignore."[67] Laird writes that the Ming appointed titles to eastern Tibetan princes, and that "these alliances with eastern Tibetan principalities are the evidence China now produces for its assertion that the Ming ruled Tibet," despite the fact that the Ming did not send an army to replace the Mongols after they left Tibet.[68] Yiu Yung-chin states that the furthest western extent of the Ming Dynasty's territory was Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan, while "the Ming did not possess Tibet."[69] Shih-Shan Henry Tsai, a professor of History and Director of Asian Studies at the University of Arkansas, writes that the Yongle Emperor sent his eunuch Yang Sanbao into Tibet in 1413 to gain the allegiance of various Tibetan princes, while Yongle paid a small fortune in return gifts for tributes in order to maintain the loyalty of neighboring vassal states such as Nepal and Tibet.[70] However, Van Praag states that Tibetan rulers upheld their own separate relations with the kingdoms of Nepal and Kashmir, and at times "engaged in armed confrontation with them."[39]
Even though the Yellow Hat sect exchanged gifts with and sent missions to the Ming court up until the 1430s,[71] the Yellow Hat sect was not mentioned in the Mingshi or the Mingshi Lu.[36] On this, historian Li Tieh-tseng says of Tsongkhapa's refusal of Ming invitations to visit Yongle's court:[36]
In China not only the emperor could do no wrong, but also his prestige and dignity had to be upheld at any cost. Had the fact been made known to the public that Ch'eng-tsu's repeated invitations extended to Tsong-ka-pa were declined, the Emperor's prestige and dignity would have been considered as lowered to a contemptible degree, especially at a time when his policy to show high favours toward lamas was by no means popular and had already caused resentment among the people. This explains why no mention of Tsong-k'a-pa and the Yellow Sect was made in the Ming Shih and Ming Shih lu.[36]
Wylie asserts that this type of censorship of the Mingshi distorts the true picture of the history of Sino-Tibetan relations, while the Ming court granted titles to various lamas regardless of their sectarian affiliations in an ongoing civil war in Tibet between competing lamaist factions.[72][73] Wylie argues that Ming titles of "King" granted indiscriminately to various Tibetan lamas or even their disciples should not be viewed as reappointments to earlier Yuan Dynasty offices, since the viceregal Sakya regime established by the Mongols in Tibet was overthrown by the Phagmodru myriarchy before the Ming existed.[74] Helmut Hoffman states that the Ming upheld the facade of rule over Tibet through periodic missions of "tribute emissaries" to the Ming court and by granting nominal titles to ruling lamas, but did not actually interfere in Tibetan governance.[37] Melvyn C. Goldstein writes that the Ming had no real administrative authority over Tibet, as the various titles given to Tibetan leaders did not confer authority as the earlier Mongol Yuan titles had.[38] He asserts that "by conferring titles on Tibetans already in power, the Ming emperors merely recognized political reality."[75] Hugh E. Richardson writes that the Ming Dynasty exercised no authority over the succession of Tibetan ruling families, the Phagmodru (1354–1436), Rinbung (1436–1565), and Tsangpa (1565–1642).[76]
Religious significance
- Further information: Chinese Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhism, and Religion in China
In his usurpation of the throne from the Jianwen Emperor (r. 1398–1402), the Yongle Emperor was aided by the Buddhist monk Yao Guangxiao, and like his father Hongwu, Yongle was "well-disposed towards Buddhism", claims Rossabi.[26] On March 10, 1403, the Yongle Emperor invited Deshin Shekpa (1384–1415), the fifth Karmapa, to his court, even though the fourth Karmapa had rejected the invitation of the Hongwu Emperor of China.[77] A Tibetan translation in the 16th century preserves the letter of Yongle, which the Association for Asian Studies notes is polite and complimentary towards the Karmapa.[77] The letter of invitation read, "My father and both parents of the queen are now dead. You are my only hope, essence of buddhahood. Please come quickly. I am sending as offering a large ingot of silver, one hundred fifty silver coins, twenty rolls of silk, a block of sandalwood, one hundred fifty bricks of tea and ten pounds of incense."[78] In order to seek out the Karmapa, Yongle dispatched his eunuch Hou Xian and the Buddhist monk Zhi Guang (d. 1435) to Tibet.[79] Traveling to Lhasa either through Qinghai or via the Silk Road to Khotan, Hou Xian and Zhi Guang did not return to Nanjing until 1407.[80]
During his travels beginning in 1403, Deshin Shekpa was induced by further exhortations by the Ming court to visit Nanjing by April 10, 1407.[77] Norbu writes that Yongle, following the tradition of Mongol emperors and their reverence for Tibetan Sakya lamas, showed an enormous amount of deference towards Deshin Shekpa. Yongle came out of the palace in Nanjing to greet the Karmapa and did not require him to kowtow like a tributary vassal.[81] According to Karma Thinley, the emperor gave the Karmapa the place of honor at his left, and on a higher throne than his own.[78] Rossabi and others describe a similar arrangement made by Kublai Khan and the Sakya Phagpa lama, writing that Kublai would "sit on a lower platform than the Tibetan cleric" when receiving religious instructions from him.[82][83] Throughout the following month, the Yongle Emperor and his court showered Deshin Shekpa with presents.[78] At Linggu Temple in Nanjing, he presided over the religious ceremonies for Yongle's deceased parents, while twenty-two days of his stay were marked by religious miracles that were recorded in five languages on a gigantic scroll that bore the Emperor's seal.[77][79] During his stay in Nanjing, Deshin Shekpa was bestowed the title "Great Treasure Prince of Dharma" by Yongle.[29] Elliot Sperling asserts that Yongle, in bestowing Deshin Shekpa with the title of "King" and praising his mystical abilities and miracles, was trying to build an alliance with the Karmapa as the Mongols had with the Sakya lamas, but Deshin Shekpa rejected Yongle's offer.[84] In fact, this was the same title that Kublai Khan had offered the Sakya Phagpa lama, but Deshin Shekpa persuaded Yongle to grant the title to religious leaders of other Tibetan Buddhist sects.[66]
Tibetan sources say Deshin Shekpa also persuaded Yongle not to impose his military might on Tibet as the Mongols had previously done.[77] Thinley writes, before Deshin Shekpa returned to Tibet, the emperor began planning to send a military force into Tibet to forcibly give the Karmapa authority over all the Tibetan Buddhist sects, but Deshin Shekpa dissuaded him.[85] But Hok-Lam Chan states that "there is little evidence that this was ever the emperor's intention" and that evidence indicates that Deshin Skekpa was invited strictly for religious purposes.[71]
Marsha Weidner states that Deshin Shekpa's miracles "testified to the power of both the emperor and his guru and served as a legitimizing tool for the emperor's problematic succession to the throne," referring to Yongle's conflict with the previous Jianwen Emperor.[86] Tsai writes that Deshin Shekpa aided the legitimacy of Yongle's rule by providing him with portents and omens which demonstrated Heaven's favor of Yongle on the Ming throne.[79]
With the example of the Ming court's relationship with the fifth Karmapa and other Tibetan leaders, Norbu states that Chinese Communist historians have failed to realize the significance of the religious aspect of the Ming-Tibetan relationship.[87] He writes that the meetings of lamas with the emperor were exchanges of tribute between "the patron and the priest" and were not merely instances of a political subordinate paying tribute to a superior.[87] He also notes that the items of tribute were Buddhist artifacts which symbolized "the religious nature of the relationship."[87] Josef Kolmaš writes that the Ming Dynasty did not exercise any direct political control over Tibet, content with their tribute relations that were "almost entirely of a religious character."[88] Patricia Ann Berger writes that Yongle's courting and granting of titles to lamas was his attempt to "resurrect the relationship between China and Tibet established earlier by the Yuan dynastic founder Khubilai Khan and his guru Phagpa."[47] She also writes that the later Qing emperors and their Mongol associates viewed Yongle's relationship with Tibet as "part of a chain of reincarnation that saw this Han Chinese emperor as yet another emanation of Manjusri."[47]
The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC preserves an edict of the Zhengtong Emperor (r. 1435–1449) addressed to the Karmapa in 1445, written after the latter's agent had brought holy relics to the Ming court.[89] Zhengtong had the following message delivered to the Great Treasure Prince of Dharma, the Karmapa:[89]
Out of compassion, Buddha taught people to be good and persuaded them to embrace his doctrines. You, who live in the remote Western Region, have inherited the true Buddhist doctrines. I am deeply impressed not only by the compassion with which you preach among the people in your region for their enlightenment, but also by your respect for the wishes of Heaven and your devotion to the Court. I am very pleased that you have sent bSod-nams-nyi-ma and other Tibetan monks here bringing with them statues of Buddha, horses and other specialties as tributes to the court.[89]
Despite this glowing message by Zhengtong, Chan writes that in 1446 the Ming court cut off all relations with the Karmapa hierarchs.[71] Until that year, the Ming court was unaware that Deshin Shekpa had died in 1415.[71] Before discovering this, the Ming court believed that the representatives of his sect who continued to visit the Ming capital were sent by him.[71]
Tribute and exchanging tea for horses
- Further information: List of tributaries of Imperial China
Tsai writes that shortly after the visit by Deshin Shekpa, Yongle ordered the construction of a road and trading posts at the upper reaches of the Yangzi River and Mekong River in order to facilitate trade with Tibet in tea, horses, and salt.[80] The trade route passed through Sichuan and crossed Shangri-La County in Yunnan.[80] Wang and Nyima assert that this "tribute-related trade" of the Ming exchanging Chinese tea for Tibetan horses—while granting Tibetan envoys and Tibetan merchants explicit permission to trade with Han Chinese merchants—"furthered the rule of the Ming Dynasty court over Tibet".[91] Rossabi and Sperling note that this trade in Tibetan horses for Chinese tea existed long before the Ming was established.[92][28] Peter C. Perdue says that obtaining horses from Inner Asia in exchange for Chinese tea was also the goal of the earlier Wang Anshi (1021–1086), who realized that China could not produce enough militarily capable steeds.[93] Horses were needed not only for cavalry but also as draft animals for the army's supply wagons.[93] The Tibetans required Chinese tea not only as a common beverage but also as a religious ceremonial supplement.[28] The Ming government imposed a monopoly on tea production and attempted to regulate this trade with state-supervised markets, but these collapsed in 1449 due to military failures and internal ecological and commercial pressures on the tea producing regions.[93][28]
Van Praag states that the Ming's establishment of diplomatic delegations with Tibet was merely an effort by the Ming court to secure urgently needed horses.[94] Wang and Nyima argue that these were not diplomatic delegations at all, that Tibetan areas were ruled by the Ming since Tibetan leaders were granted positions as Ming officials, that horses were collected from Tibet as a mandatory "corvée" tax, and therefore Tibetans were "undertaking domestic affairs, not foreign diplomacy".[95] Sperling writes that the Ming simultaneously bought horses in the Kham region while fighting Tibetan tribes in Amdo and receiving Tibetan embassies in Nanjing.[25] He also argues that the embassies of Tibetan lamas visiting the Ming court were for the most part efforts to promote commercial transactions between the lamas' large, wealthy entourage and Ming Chinese merchants and officials.[96] Kolmaš writes that while the Ming maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet and limited the numbers of the Tibetan retinues, the Tibetans sought to maintain a tributary relationship with the Ming because imperial patronage provided them with wealth and power.[97] Laird writes that Tibetans eagerly sought Ming court invitations since the gifts the Tibetans received for bringing tribute were much greater in value than the latter.[98] As for Yongle's gifts to his Tibetan and Nepalese vassals such as silver wares, Buddha relics, utensils for Buddhist temples and religious ceremonies, and gowns and robes for monks, Tsai writes "in his effort to draw neighboring states to the Ming orbit so that he could bask in glory, Yongle was quite willing to pay a small price."[99] The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC lists the Tibetan tribute items as oxen, horses, camels, sheep, fur products, medical herbs, Tibetan incenses, thangkas (painted scrolls), and handicrafts while the Ming awarded Tibetan tribute-bearers with an equal value of gold, silver, satin and brocade, bolts of cloth, grains, and tea leaves.[1] Silk workshops during the Ming also catered specifically to the Tibetan market with silk clothes and furnishings featuring Tibetan Buddhist iconography.[90]
While the Ming Dynasty traded horses with Tibet, it upheld a policy of outlawing border markets in the north, which Laird says was an effort to punish the Mongols for their raids and to "drive them from the frontiers of China."[100] However, when Altan Khan (1507–1582)—leader of the Tümed Mongols who overthrew the Oirat Mongol confederation's hegemony over the steppes—made peace with the Ming Dynasty in 1571, he persuaded the Ming to reopen their border markets in 1573.[100] This provided the Chinese with a new supply of horses that the Mongols had in excess; it was also a relief to the Ming, since they were unable to stop the Mongols from periodic raiding.[100] Laird says that despite the fact that later Mongols believed Altan forced the Ming to view him as an equal, Chinese historians argue that he was simply a loyal Chinese citizen.[100] By 1578, Altan Khan formed a formidable Mongol-Tibetan alliance with the Yellow Hat sect that the Ming viewed from afar without intervention.[101][102][103]
Armed intervention and border stability
Patricia Ebrey writes that Tibet, like Joseon Korea and other neighboring states to the Ming, settled for its tributary status while there were no troops or governors of Ming China stationed in its territory.[104] Laird writes that "after the Mongol troops left Tibet, no Ming troops replaced them."[68] Wang and Nyima state that, despite the fact that the Ming refrained from sending troops to subdue Tibet and refrained from garrisoning Ming troops there, these measures were unnecessary so long as the Ming court upheld close ties with Tibetan vassals and their forces.[34] However, there were instances in the 14th century when Emperor Hongwu did use military force to quell unrest in Tibet. John D. Langlois writes that there was unrest in Tibet and western Sichuan, which the Marquis Mu Ying (沐英) was commissioned to quell in November 1378 after he established a Taozhou garrison in Gansu.[105] Langlois notes that by October 1379, Mu Ying had allegedly captured 30,000 Tibetan prisoners and 200,000 domesticated animals.[105] Yet invasion went both ways; the Ming general Qu Neng, under the command of Lan Yu, was ordered to repel a Tibetan assault into Sichuan in 1390.[106]
Discussions of strategy in the mid Ming Dynasty focused primarily on recovery of the Ordos region, which the Mongols used as a rallying base to stage raids into Ming China.[107] Norbu states that the Ming Dynasty, preoccupied with the Mongol threat to the north, could not spare additional armed forces to enforce or back up their claim of sovereignty over Tibet; instead, they relied on "Confucian instruments of tribute relations" of heaping unlimited number of titles and gifts on Tibetan lamas through acts of diplomacy.[108] Sperling states that the delicate relationship between the Ming and Tibet was "the last time a united China had to deal with an independent Tibet," that there was a potential for armed conflict at their borders, and that the ultimate goal of Ming foreign policy with Tibet was not subjugation but "avoidance of any kind of Tibetan threat."[109] P. Christiaan Klieger argues that the Ming court's patronage of high Tibetan lamas "was designed to help stabilize border regions and protect trade routes."[110]
Historians Luciano Petech and Sato Hisashi argue that the Ming upheld a "divide-and-rule" policy towards a weak and politically fragmented Tibet after the Sakya regime had fallen.[67] Chan writes that this was perhaps the calculated strategy of Yongle, as exclusive patronage to one Tibetan sect would have given it too much regional power.[111] Sperling finds no textual evidence in either Chinese or Tibetan sources to support this thesis of Petech and Hisashi.[67] Norbu asserts that their thesis is largely based on the list of Ming titles conferred on Tibetan lamas rather than "comparative analysis of developments in China and Tibet."[67] Rossabi states that this theory "attributes too much influence to the Chinese," pointing out that Tibet was already politically divided when the Ming Dynasty began.[28] Rossabi also discounts the "divide-and-rule" theory on the grounds of Yongle's failed attempt to build a strong relationship with the fifth Karmapa—one which he hoped would parallel Kublai Khan's earlier relationship with the Sakya Phagpa lama.[66] Instead, Yongle followed the Karmapa's advice of giving patronage to many different Tibetan lamas.[66]
The Association for Asian Studies states that there is no known written evidence to suggest that later leaders of the Yellow Hat sect—First Dalai Lama Gendun Drup (1391–1474) and Second Dalai Lama Gendun Gyatso (1475–1571)—had any contacts with Ming China.[112] These two religious leaders were preoccupied with an overriding concern for dealing with the powerful secular princes of Rinbung, who were patrons and protectors of the Black Hat Karmapa lamas.[112] The Rinbung leaders were relatives of the Phagmodru, yet their authority shifted over time from simple governors to rulers in their own right over large areas of Ü-Tsang.[113] The prince of Rinbung occupied Lhasa in 1498 and excluded the Yellow Hat sect from attending New Years ceremonies and prayers, the most important event in the Yellow Hat sect.[114] While the task of New Years prayers in Lhasa was granted to the Karmapa and others, Gendun Gyatso traveled in exile looking for allies.[114] However, it was not until 1518 that the secular Phagmodru ruler captured Lhasa from the Rinbung, and thereafter the Yellow Hat sect was given rights to conduct the New Years prayer.[114] When the Red Hat abbot of the Drigung Monastery threatened Lhasa in 1537, Gendun Gyatso was forced to abandon the Drepung Monastery, although he eventually returned.[114]
The Zhengde Emperor (r. 1505–1521), who enjoyed the company of lamas at court despite protests from the censorate, had heard tales of a "living Buddha" which he desired to host at the Ming capital; this was none other than the Rinbung-supported Karmapa then occupying Lhasa.[115] Zhengde's top advisors made every attempt to dissuade him from inviting this lama to court, arguing that Tibetan Buddhism was wildly heterodox and unorthodox.[27] Despite protests by the Grand Secretary Liang Chu, in 1515 the Zhengde Emperor sent his eunuch official Liu Yun of the palace chancellery on a mission to invite this Karmapa to Beijing.[116] Liu commanded a fleet of hundreds of ships requisitioned along the Yangzi River, consuming 2,835 g (100 oz) of silver a day in food expenses while stationed for a year in Chengdu of Sichuan.[117] After procurring necessary gifts for the mission, he departed with a cavalry force of about 1,000 troops.[117] When the request was delivered, the Karmapa lama refused to leave Tibet despite the Ming force brought to coerce him.[117] The Karmapa launched a surprise ambush on Liu Yun's camp, seizing all the goods and valuables while killing or wounding half of Liu Yun's entire escort.[117] After this fiasco, Liu fled for his life, but only returned to Chengdu several years later to find that the Zhengde Emperor had died.[117]
Tibetans as a "national minority"
Elliot Sperling, a specialist of Indian studies and the director of the Tibetan Studies program at Indiana University’s Department of Central Eurasia Studies, writes that "the idea that Tibet became part of China in the 13th century is a very recent construction."[119] He writes that Chinese writers of the early 20th century were of the view that Tibet was not annexed by China until the Manchu Qing Dynasty invasion during the 18th century.[119] He also states that Chinese writers of the early 20th century described Tibet as a feudal dependent of China, not an integral part of it.[119] Sperling states that this is because "Tibet was ruled as such, within the empires of the Mongols and the Manchus" and also that "China's intervening Ming Dynasty ... had no control over Tibet."[119] He writes that the Ming relationship with Tibet is problematic for China’s insistence of its unbroken sovereignty over Tibet since the 13th century.[119] As for the Tibetan view that Tibet was never subject to the rule of the Yuan or Qing emperors of China, Sperling also discounts this by stating that Tibet was "subject to rules, laws and decisions made by the Yuan and Qing rulers" and that eve