The anthropologistsGregory Bateson and Margaret Mead contrasted first and second-order Cybernetics with this diagram in an inteview in 1973.1. It emphasizes the requirement for a possibly constructivist participant observer in the second order case.
Heinz von Foerster attributes the origin of second-order cybernetics to the attempts of classical cyberneticians to construct a model of the mind. Researchers realized that:
. . . a brain is required to write a theory of a brain. From this follows that a theory of the brain, that has any aspirations for completeness, has to account for the writing of this theory. And even more fascinating, the writer of this theory has to account for her or himself. Translated into the domain of cybernetics; the cybernetician, by entering his own domain, has to account for his or her own activity. Cybernetics then becomes cybernetics of cybernetics, or second-order cybernetics.2
Heinz von Foerster (1974), Cybernetics of Cybernetics, Urbana Illinois: University of Illinois.
Heinz von Foerster (1981), 'Observing Systems", Intersystems Publications, Seaside, CA.
Heinz von Foerster (2003), Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition, New York : Springer-Verlag.
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1988). "The Tree of Knowledge", Shambhala, Boston and London.
Humberto Maturana and Bernhard Poerksen (2004), "From Being to Doing". Carl-Auer Verlag, Heidelberg.
Gordon Pask (1996). Heinz von Foerster's Self-Organisation, the Progenitor of Conversation and Interaction Theories, Systems Research 13, 3, pp. 349-362
Scott, B. (2001). Conversation Theory: a Dialogic, Constructivist Approach to Educational Technology, Cybernetics and Human Knowing, 8, 4, pp. 25-46.
William Irwin Thompson (ed.), (1987), 'Gaia - a way of knowing". Lindisfarne Press, New York.
Francisco Varela (1991), "The Embodied Mind", MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Francisco Varela, (1999), "Ethical Know-How", Stanford University Press.