Historical approachesBritishBritish military history is the source of some of the earliest orders of battle in the English language, and due to the British Empire's involvement in global conflicts over several centuries the records of historical orders of battle provide an excellent source of study and understanding not only of the composition, but also of tactics and doctrines of the forces through their depiction in the orders of battle. The British Army and UK forces use ORBAT to describe the structure of both friendly and enemy forces. ClausewitzClausewitz defined the ‘order of battle’ as “that division and formation of the different arms into separate parts or sections of the whole Army, and that form of general position or disposition of those parts which is to be the norm throughout the whole campaign or war.” Division comes from the permanent peace organisation of the Army, with certain parts such as battalions, squadrons, and batteries being formed into units of higher order up to the highest of all, the whole Army. Disposition comes from the tactics and how these troops are to be drawn up for the battle. Normally these tactics are exercised in peace and can’t be essentially modified when war breaks out. Order of battle belongs more to tactics than strategy. Clausewitz also noted that the order of battle depends on the effective span of control by a commander. Too few subunits makes an army unwieldy; too many subunits makes the ‘power of the superior will’ weak; and in addition every step by which an order has to pass weakens its effect by loss of force and Longer time of transmission. Clausewitz recommended that armies have no more than eight to ten subunits and subordinate corps four to six subunits. 1 United States ArmyIn the United States Army practice, an order of battle should relate what an American unit might be expected to encounter while on field operations. Orders of battle analysts consider enemy units, personnel, and equipment as they may be used on any given sector of combat. The United States Army divides an order of battle entry on an intelligence status report by the following factors:
The collection of order-of-battle data is the responsibility of the unit commander, through the G-2/J-2 (intelligence) section. A U.S. Army military intelligence group maintains an Order of Battle Section as part of brigade HQ. The rule of thumb used by American military intelligence is that each unit should keep track of enemy subunits two echelons below its own: that is, a division should monitor enemy units confronting it down to battalion, a brigade should monitor enemy units down to companies, and a battalion should monitor enemy forces down to platoons. General George S. Patton was one of the first to recommend this practice. The United States military's intelligence capabilities in the 21st century have allowed for monitoring even further than two echelons down the chain of command. It is quite common for a US battalion-group to be able to identify the location and activities of not only squad level enemy forces but even individual vehicles. This "situational awareness" provides a more complete picture of the battlefield for US forces. Up until the end of the Cold War, order of battle was generally an orderly but extremely frustrating process for NATO because although Warsaw Pact nations had well known order of battle, tactics, techniques and procedures, that of the Soviet Army fluctuated often, significantly, and changes were often undetected for years at below-division levels. The situation has been exacerbated today when the US Army is engaged in operations against a non-traditional enemy (insurgents, guerrillas, etc.) and no order of battle can be compiled, the equivalent military intelligence output requiring an increase in acquired data and analysis effort to provide an accurate and timely picture to the combat commander. See also
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