The PrinciplesPrinciple IAny person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment. Principle IIThe fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law. Principle IIIThe fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law. Principle IVThe fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him. Principle VAny person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law. Principle VIThe crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law:
Principle VIIComplicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international law. Application of the Principles in State PracticeThe Governments participating in the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations were opposed to conferring on the United Nations legislative power to enact binding rules of international law. As a corollary, they also rejected proposals to confer on the General Assembly the power to impose certain general conventions on States by some form of majority vote. There was, however, strong support for conferring on the General Assembly the more limited powers of study and recommendation, which led to the adoption of Article 13 of the Charter. It obliges the United Nations General Assembly to initiate studies and to make recommendations that encourage the progressive development of international law and its codification. The Nuremberg Principles were developed by UN organs under that limited mandate.2 Unlike treaty law, customary international law is not written. To prove that a certain rule is customary one has to show that it is reflected in state practice and that there exists a conviction in the international community that such practice is required as a matter of law. In this context, "practice" relates to official state practice and therefore includes formal statements by states. A contrary practice by some states is possible because if this contrary practice is condemned by other states or eventually denied by the government itself the original rule is actually confirmed.3 CanadaNuremberg Principle IV, and its reference to an individual’s responsibility, was at issue in Canada in the case of Hinzman v. Canada. Jeremy Hinzman was a U.S. Army deserter who claimed refugee status in Canada as a conscientious objector, one of many Iraq War resisters. Hinzman's lawyer, Jeffry House had previously raised the issue of the legality of the Iraq War as having a bearing on their case. The Federal Court ruling was released on March 31, 2006, and denied the refugee status claim.45 In the decision, Justice Anne L. Mactavish addressed the issue of personal responsibility:
On Nov 15, 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada refused to hear the case on appeal, without giving reasons.8 See also
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