Iraqi Army

The Iraqi Army is the land force of Iraq, active in various forms since being formed by the British during their mandate over the country after World War I.

Today, it is a component of the Iraqi Security Forces tasked with assuming responsibility for all Iraqi land-based military operations following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. Because of the ongoing Iraqi insurgency, the Iraqi Army is designed to be an objective counter-insurgency force for a period of time until the insurgency is diminished to a level that the police can handle.^[10] Thereafter, the Iraqi Army will undergo a modernization plan which includes purchasing more heavy equipment.

Pre-2003 History

The first Iraqi military forces established by the British were the Iraq Levies, several battalions of troops tasked to guard the Royal Air Force bases from which the British controlled Iraq. The threat of war with Turkey, who claimed the Ottoman vilyet of Mosul as part of their country, led the British to formed the Iraqi Army proper in 1921 and an air force six years later.^[11]

Notable early Iraqi Army operations included the Anglo-Iraqi War, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, in which the Iraqis deployed an expeditionary force which peaked at 15-18,000 men, and operations against the Kurds from 1961-1970.^[12] However in 1958 the Army started its long involvement in politics when Abd Al-Karim Qasim mounted a successful coup d'etat, the 14 July Revolution, against the Iraqi monarchy. In 1961 a buildup of the Army close to Kuwait, in conjunction with Iraqi claims over the small neighbouring state, led to a crisis with British land forces deployed to Kuwait for a period.

Later, Saddam Hussein, looking to build fighting power against Iran soon after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War doubled the size of the Iraqi army from 1981, when it numbered 200,000 soldiers in 12 divisions and 3 independent brigades, to 1985, when it had 500,000 men in 23 divisions and nine brigades. By the eve of the Invasion of Kuwait which led to the 1991 Gulf War, the Army had 955,000 men, 42 infantry and seven armoured divisions, and 20 special forces brigades, grouped in seven corps, plus six Iraqi Republican Guard divisions.^[13]

The IISS estimated the Army's composition immediately after the 1991 War as 6 'armoured'/'mechanised' divisions, 23 infantry divisions, 8 Republican Guard divisions and four Republican Guard internal security divisions.^[14] Jane's Defence Weekly for 18 July 1992 stated that 10,000 troops from 5 divisions were fighting against Shia Moslems in the southern marshlands.

The IISS gave the Iraqi Army's force structure as of 1 July 1997 as seven Corps headquarters, six armoured or mechanised divisions, 12 infantry divisions, 6 RGF divisions, four Special Republican Guard Brigades, 10 commando, and two Special Forces Brigades.^[15] It was estimated to number 350,000 personnel, including 100,000 recently recalled reservists.

Structure at the start of the 2003 invasion

In January 2003, before the beginning of the 2003 Iraq War, the force was primarily located in eastern Iraq. The 5 corps were organised as follows:

Development

One of the many organizations created to take on the duties of the former Iraqi army, the New Iraqi Army was originally intended to comprise of 3 divisions numbering 40,000 soldiers in 3 years time.

The Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (headed by Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton) was the organization set up by the United States military with the responsibility of training and development of the new army. In June 2004, it was dissolved and forced to pass on that responsibility to the MNSTC-I (initially headed by Lt. Gen. David Petraeus) due to its focus on developing the military for traditional defense from a hypothetical invasion by its neighbors rather than providing security for the Iraqi people from the emerging threat posed by the Iraqi insurgency ^[17].

According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the Iraqi Army will in the end state be an approximately 137,500-person force based around an Army with 9 infantry divisions and 1 mechanized infantry division consisting of 36 brigades and 112 battalions. Nine Motorized Transportation Regiments, 5 logistics battalions, 2 support battalions, 5 Regional Support Units (RSUs), and 91 Garrison Support Units (GSUs) are intended to provide logistics and support for each division, with Taji National Depot providing depot-level maintenance and resupply. Each battalion, brigade, and division headquarters will be supported by a Headquarters and Service Company (HSC) providing logistical and maintenance support to its parent organization. The Army will also include 17 SIBs and a Special Operations Forces Brigade consisting of two special operational battalions.^[10] MNSTC-I commander Martin Dempsey stated June 2006 that the IA "will be built by the end of this calendar year".^[18]

The DOD reported that as of February 19, 2007 there were a total of 103 operational army combat battalions with an additional 9 still in development^[4]. It also reported that the army had one mechanized battalion in the reserve^[4].

The New Iraqi Army excludes recruits that are former regime security and intelligence organizations members, personnel of the Special Republican Guard, top-level Ba'ath Party members, and Ba'ath Party security and militia organizations. ^[19]

Timeline

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Structure

As of March 2008, the 180,000 soldiers of the Iraqi Army are organised into 105 battalions split into 13 divisions (1st-14th, the designation 13 not being used).^[38] The 13 divisions are split into four commands. The Baghdad Operational Command falls under the direct command of the prime minister in the National Operations Center, while the other three commands fall under the command of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command. Each Iraqi army division has four line brigades, an engineering regiment, and a support regiment. In 2009, a field artillery regiment will be added to each division, with an artillery battalion added to each brigade.^[39]

Training

Training of Iraqi forces was initially done by private contractors, transitioned to coalition forces, and is now done by three Iraqi training battalions. Training has been impeded by domestic instability, infiltration by insurgents, and high desertion rates.

Since June 2004, the partnership between Coalition forces and Iraqi forces has increased due to the growing number of battalions in the Iraqi army, which then stood around 115. Out of this number, it was deemed that 80 of them were able to carry out operations in the field with Coalition support limited to logistics and strategic planning, whilst another 20-30 battlions still needed major Coalition support to carry out their operations.

As of October 5, 2005 the New Iraqi Army had 90 battalions trained well enough to be "deployed independently", i.e. without the help of others such as the United States.^[47]

There are three levels of troop capability in the New Iraqi Army: one, two, and three. Level three refers to troops that have just completed basic training, level two refers to troops that are able to work with soldiers, and level one refers to troops that can work by themselves.

Members of NATO's training mission in Iraq (NTM-I) opened a Joint Staff College in ar-Rustamiya in Baghdad on September 27, 2005 with 300 trainers. Training at NATO bases in Norway, Italy, Jordan, Germany, and Egypt have also taken place and 16 NATO countries have allocated forces to the training effort.^[48].

Recruits and enlisted men

Iraqi Army recruits undergo a standard eight week ^[3] basic training course that includes basic soldiering skills, weapons marksmanship and individual tactics. Former soldiers are eligible for an abbreviated three week "Direct Recruit Replacement Training" course designed to replace regular basic training to be followed by more training once they have been assigned to a unit.

Soldiers later go on to enroll in more specific advanced courses targeted for their respective fields. This could involve going to the Military Intelligence School, the Signal School, the Bomb Disposal School, the Combat Arms Branch School, the Engineer School, and the Military Police School.

Officers

CMATT's main recruiting stations are located in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. The most desired recruits are individuals who have prior military service or are skilled in specific professions such as first aid, heavy equipment operation, food service and truck driving. A recruitment target of approximately one thousand men is desired to eventually form a 757-man battalion. Soldier fallout usually occurs due to voluntary withdrawal or failure to meet training standards.

Due to the current demand for these battalions to become active as soon as possible, the first four battalions' officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men are being trained simultaneously (in separate groups). Notable differences in training between CMATT and former training under Saddam's regime include schooling in human rights, the laws of land warfare, and tolerance in a multi-ethnic team.

Based on the philosophy used by the U.S. military to boost its own size in response to World War II — that an army can be built faster by focusing on the training on its leadership rather than enlisted men — CMATT has pursued a similar strategy of focusing recruitment and training on commissioned and non-commissioned officers for the remaining 23 Iraqi battalions. Upon successful completion of officer training, these groups of officers will form the battalion's leadership cadre, which will then be responsible for overseeing its own recruitment, training, and readiness of its enlisted men. It is hoped that having the Iraqi leadership train its own will overcome problems faced by CMATT's training process; namely recruitment, desertion, and unit loyalty.

Military Transition Teams

All Iraqi Army battalions have embedded U.S. Military transition teams, according to the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. The MiTTs advise their Iraqi battalions in the areas of intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics and infantry tactics. Larger scale operations are often done jointly with American battalions. This operational training aims to make the battalion self-sustainable tactically, operationally and logistically so that the battalion will be prepared to take over responsibility for battle space.

The DOD (as of March '07) reported that 6000 advisors arranged in 480+ teams were embedded with Iraqi units^[4]; however, in April, the Congressional Research Service reported that only around 4000 U.S. forces were embedded with Iraqi units at a rate of 10 per battalion^[3].

Command of all but one of the Iraqi Army's 10 divisions has been turned over to the Iraqi government; they are now under the command of Lt. General Ali Ghaidan Majid rather than being led by the American military.^[50]

Equipment

Virtually all of the equipment used by the former Iraqi Army was either destroyed by the U.S. and British during Operation Iraqi Freedom or was looted during the chaotic aftermath shortly after the fall of the Hussein regime. Four T-55 tanks however have been recovered from an old army base in al-Muqdadiyah and are now in service with the 1st Mechanized Division.

On February 2, 2004 the U.S government announced that Nour USA was awarded a $327,485,798 contract to procure equipment for both the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi National Guard; however, this contract was canceled in March 2004 when an internal Army investigation (initiated due to complaints from losing bidders) revealed that Army procurement officers in Iraq were violating procedures with sloppy contract language and incomplete paperwork.

On May 25, 2004 the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) stated that they would award a contract worth $259,321,656 to ANHAM Joint Venture in exchange for procuring the necessary equipment (and providing its required training) for a minimum of 15 and a maximum of 35 battalions. The minimum bid would begin to be delivered immediately and further orders could be placed until the maximum of 35 battalion sets or September 2006 after the first order was fully delivered.

In May 2005, Hungary agreed to donate 77 T-72's to the Iraqi Army, with the refurbishment contract going to Defense Solutions to bring the tanks up to operational status for an estimated 4.5 million dollars US^[51]. After a delay in the payment of funds from the Iraqi government^[52], Iraq's 9th Army Mechanized Division received the tanks at its headquarters in Taji over a three day period starting on November 8, 2005^[51].

On July 29, 2005, the United Arab Emirates gained approval to purchase 180 M113A1 APCs in good-condition from Switzerland, with the intent to transfer them to Iraq as a gift. Domestic political opposition successfully froze the sale, fearing that the export would violate the country's longstanding tradition of neutrality as well as perhaps make Switzerland a target for terrorism^[53].

173 M113s, 44 Panhards, and 300 Spartans donated by Jordan, Pakistan and UAE. 600 Dzik-3 (Ain Jaria) APCs were ordered in Poland (option 1200) for delivery by Jan 2007. 573 Akrep APCs for delivery by Jan 2007. 756 Cougar H APCs (option 1050) for delivery by November 2008.

713 M1114s and 400 M1151s purchased for IA with delivery complete by end July 2006.

Serbia has signed a US$230m deal with Iraq to sell weapons and military equipment, the defence ministry said in March 2008. It did not specify the weapons but Serbian military experts believe they include Serbian-made CZ-99 hand guns,Zastava M21 5.56 mm assault rifles, machine guns, anti-tank weapons(most likly M79 "Osa",Bumbar,or M90 "Strsljen"), ammunition and explosives and about 20 Lasta 95 basic trainer aircrafts. Iraq's defence Minister Abdul-Qadir al-Obaidi visited Belgrade in September and November to discuss boosting military ties with Serbia.^[54]^[55]

The average Iraqi soldier's gear consist of a 6-colored "chocolate-chip" uniform or Desert Battle Unifrom, a PASGT ballistic helmet, ballistic vest, web gear, radio, grenades and an AK-47 or, depending on the unit, M16 rifle. ^[56]

Challenges and criticisms

The New Iraq Army currently faces multiple challenges it must overcome to establish itself as the premier symbol of authority in Iraq. These include:

Iraqi insurgency

Based on Bush administration expectations that coalition forces would be welcomed as liberators after the overthrow of the Hussein regime, prewar planners had only been expecting minimal if any resistance from the Iraqi people.

For a multitude of reasons, this ideal scenario has not materialized and now the New Iraqi Army faces an insurgency which has caused more coalition casualties than during the war itself. An increase in size as well as an increased sophistication in the nature of the attacks has seriously weakened the efforts of the New Iraqi Army to maintain internal security.

Equipment

The Iraqi Army continues to face significant challenges securing an adequate weapons supply because its equipment plans have never matched the threats it has faced.

Poor weapon registration

A 2006 report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) notes that out of the 370,000 weapons turned over to the US since the fall of Saddam's regime, only 12,000 serial numbers have been recorded^[57]. The lack of proper accounting for these weapons makes small arms proliferation to anti governmental forces such as insurgents or sectarian militias much easier.

Infiltration

The Iraqi Army is widely known to have been infiltrated by a multitude of groups ranging from local militias to foreign insurgents. This has led to highly publicized deaths and compromised operations (perhaps the most prominent being the 2004 attack on a US military base near Mosul in December 2004. More than 20 people, including 13 American servicemen, were killed when a suicide bomber wearing an Iraqi military uniform detonated his vest inside a dining tent.^[58]). Infiltration by elements not primarily loyal to the Iraqi Army presents an ongoing danger to the lives and operations of the entire army.

Inadequate intelligence gathering capabilities

The Iraqi Army currently has no formalized apparatus for the collection of military intelligence (similar to the DIA). Currently it must rely on intelligence provided by the United States for the majority of its operations. Developing a professional intelligence corps to augment the effectiveness of the Iraqi Army remains an ongoing challenge.

Lack of adequate logistical support

The Iraqi Army presently must rely on US logistical support to conduct the majority of its operations^[59]. It currently lacks critical support services such as transportation, medevac capabilities, medical logistics, and intelligence. Until the Iraqi Army can develop these capabilities, it will continue to depend on US forces for support.

Insufficient advisory effort

As of October 2006, there are approximately 4000 US combat advisor's embedded with Iraqi units out of 130,000 US soldiers stationed in that country. Defense analyst Andrew Krepinevich argues that the roughly twelve advisors per Iraqi battalion (approximately 500 troops) is less than half the sufficient amount needed to efficiently implement the combat advisory effort ^[60]. Krepinevich argues that officers try to avoid taking on advisory tasks because the potential for promotion is much lower due to the US Army's culture of promoting officers that have served with a domestic unit over ones that have served with foreign forces. ^[61]

No military judicial punishment system

The Iraqi Army currently lacks a military judicial punishment system thus giving those in command little leverage over subordinates who would choose to disobey orders.

Ineffective leadership at the Ministry of Defense

The current Minister of Defense, Abd al-Qadr Muhammed Jassim al-Obaidi, has limited experience and faces a number of hurdles impeding his effective governance. Some of the major problems include inheriting a staff that is notorious for favorism, corruption, and deeply divided along sectarian and ethnic lines. He rivals with the Minister of the Interior, Jawad al-Bolani, National Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubai, and Minister of Staff for National Security Affairs, Shirwan al-Waili. He has been criticized for not being able to stand up to the Badr Organization and Mehdi Army members which dominate his own party. In addition, as a Sunni he faces inherent challenges working within a Shiite-dominated government.

Iranian influence

An estimated 150 Iranian intelligence officers, plus members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Command, are believed to be active inside Iraq at any given time^[62]. For more than a year, US troops have detained and recorded fingerprints, photographs, and DNA samples from dozens of suspected Iranian agents in a catch and release program designed to intimidate the Iranian leadership^[62]. Iranian influence is felt most heavily within the Iraqi Government, the ISF, and Shiite militias.

Governmental

Iranian influence is felt heavily within the SCIRI and its armed wing the Badr Organization. An unnamed US intelligence analyst has commented that Iran funds many different groups to ensure substantial influence regardless of which faction is likely to dominate the political or military power base ^[63].

Insurgency

Interrogation of members from the Qazali terror network revealed that the group had received substantial Iran-based training in explosives technology; arms and munitions; and some cases of advice. All this is alleged by the U.S. military to have taken place through the Quds force of the Iranian Republican Guards Corps^[64]. It is also known that Iran supports Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army.

No national banking system

Poor levels of internal security have stifled attempts to build any national banking or credit systems. In lieu of such organizations, Iraqi units operate at any given time with an estimated 10-20% absenteeism rate due to soldiers temporarily leaving their units to deliver income back to their families ^[65]. This can be especially grueling if the unit is on deployment outside of their home province as the absenteeism time is naturally increased.

Lack of military medical services

All military hospitals under the Saddam regime were looted and abandoned during the 2003 invasion of Iraq; as such, the Iraqi Army currently fields no military hospitals^[66]. There is only one military prosthetics facility in the country and virtually no mental health or burn treatment services. Wounded Iraqi soldiers are expected to receive treatment either at civilian hospitals or if possible, at Coalition medical facilities^[66]. Corruption practices spurred partly by over-taxation at these civilian hospitals significantly drive up costs to the soldier. Due to overwhelming red tape within the Iraqi military compensation system, it is commonplace for the soldier to end up bearing the financial brunt of medical expenses^[66].

Contents

Pre-2003 History

Structure at the start of the 2003 invasion

Development

Timeline

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Structure

Training

Recruits and enlisted men

Officers

Military Transition Teams

Equipment

Challenges and criticisms

Iraqi insurgency

Equipment

Poor weapon registration

Infiltration

Inadequate intelligence gathering capabilities

Lack of adequate logistical support

Insufficient advisory effort

No military judicial punishment system

Ineffective leadership at the Ministry of Defense

Iranian influence

Governmental

Insurgency

No national banking system

Lack of military medical services

See also

References

Further reading