| content |
| International opposition to Apartheid in South Africa |
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| Campaigns |
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Disinvestment · Academic boycott |
| Instruments and legislation |
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UN Resolution 1761 (1962) |
| Organisations |
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Anti-Apartheid Movement |
| Conferences |
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1964 Conference for Economic Sanctions |
| United Nations Security Council Resolutions |
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Resolution 181 · Resolution 191 |
| Other aspects |
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Elimination of Racism Day |
Constructive engagement was the name given to the policy of the Reagan Administration towards the apartheid regime in South Africa in the early 1980s and was promoted as an alternative to the economic sanctions and divestment from South Africa demanded by the UN General Assembly and the international anti-apartheid movement.[1]
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Encouraging South Africa
The Reagan Administration vetoed legislation from the United States Congress and blocked attempts by the United Nations to impose sanctions and to isolate South Africa.[2] Instead, advocates of constructive engagement sought to use incentives as a means of encouraging South Africa gradually to move away from apartheid.[3] The policy, which was echoed by the British government led by Margaret Thatcher, came under criticism as South African government repression of the black population and anti-apartheid activists intensified.[4] The policy's architect, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker, designed it to link the independence of South African–occupied Namibia to an easing of the arms embargo against South Africa and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.[5] Constructive engagement and "the fearlessly soft attitude displayed by Chester Crocker towards apartheid" were blamed by author/journalist Christopher Hitchens for the ten-year delay in implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 and securing Namibia's independence:[6]
"Independence on these terms could have been won years ago if it were not for Crocker's procrastination and Reagan's attempt to change the subject to the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. Here again, the United States dogmatically extended diplomatic recognition to one side only – South Africa's. Here again, without 'neutral' mediators American policy would have deservedly become the victim of its own flagrant bias. An important participant was Bernt Carlsson, UN Commissioner for Namibia, who worked tirelessly for free elections in the colony and tried to isolate the racists diplomatically."
Presidential veto overridden
In October 1986, President Reagan's veto of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was overridden by the United States Congress (by the Senate 78 to 21, the House by 313 to 83) despite objections by conservative members such as Dick Cheney, who noted that Nelson Mandela was the head of an organization the State Dept had deemed "terrorist".[7] The legislation, which banned all new U.S. trade and investment in South Africa, was a catalyst for similar sanctions in Europe and Japan, and signalled the end of the constructive engagement policy.
References
- ^ Sanford J. Ungar and Peter Vale, "Why Constructive Engagement failed", Current Affairs, Winter 85/86
- ^ Manzo, Kate, "U.S. South Africa Policy in the 1980s: Constructive Engagement and Beyond", Review of Policy Research, Vol. 6 Issue 2 Page 212 November 1986
- ^ Deborah Toler, "Constructive Engagement: Reactionary Pragmatism at Its Best", Issue: A Journal of Opinion, Vol. 12, No. 3/4 (Autumn - Winter, 1982), pp. 11-18
- ^ James Hamill, "South Africa and the Commonwealth part one: the years of acrimony - Commonwealth of Nations", Contemporary Review, July 1995
- ^ J.E. Davies, Constructive Engagement?: Chester Crocker & American Policy in South Africa, Namibia & Angola, Ohio University Press, 2007
- ^ Hitchens, Christopher (1993). For the sake of Argument: Essays and Minority Reports. Verso, 99. ISBN 0-86-091435-6.
- ^ "Cheney and Mandela: Reconciling The Truth About Cheney's Vote".
See also
External links
- Why Constructive Engagement failed, by Sanford J. Ungar and Peter Vale, Current Affairs, Winter 85/86
