Existing U.S. and the Combat Status Review TribunalsSecretary of the Navy Gordon England stated[7]:
Thus, the tribunals themselves are modeled after the procedures—AR 190-8 Tribunals—the military uses to make determinations in compliance with the Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention (that states "Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.")[8] This is most likely because, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a plurality of the Supreme Court suggested the Department of Defense empanel tribunals similar to the AR 190 to make factual status determinations. The mandate of the CSRTs and the AR 190-8 Tribunals differed in that AR 190-8 Tribunals were authorized to determine that captives were civilians, who should be released, and "lawful combatants", who the Geneva Conventions protect from prosecution..[9] Conduct of Combatant Status Review TribunalsThe exact location of the current CSRT hearings is unknown, but prior CSRT hearings were held in trailers in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Images of the trailers, with the white, plastic chairs the detainees sat in shackled to the floor and the large, black leather chair behind a microphone where the President sat can be found on the DoD website.[10] The Presiding OfficersThe identity of the presiding officers at CSRTs hearings is classified. In the PDF files of the CSRT transcripts released on the DoD website, that information has been removed from the transcripts. The ranks of those present, however, and their service branch do remain in the documents. So, for Guleed Hassan Ahmed's CSRT in April 2007, one finds that the CSRT President was a Lieutenant Colonel and U.S. Air Force Member. Other services present include the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army; the only other rank present, in this case, was Gunnery Sergeant.[11] In other CSRTs, the ranks, services, and persons present appear to varry. At certain CSRTs when required, a non-military, language analyst was present. Role of the CSRT RecorderThe CSRT Recorder had several tasks. First, he or she was charged with keeping a record of the CSRT process by recording the CSRT process. Second, the Recorder swore in all the CSRT participants by administering an oath. Third, the Recorder was also charged with presenting classified and unclassified material during the CSRTs. Fourth, the Recorder was often asked to explain or clarrify facts or information during the CSRT. In Guleed Hassan Ahmed's CSRT transcript one finds the following exchange: PRESIDENT:[The]Tribunal has completed its review of the unclassified evidence provided. We do have one question for the Recorder. Is Somalia, Ethiopia, and/or Kenya a coalition partner? Role of the Detainee at CSRTsDetainees had the option of attending their CSRTs, but attendance was not mandated. Some detainees protested the CSRTs by not attending, opting instead to send personal, written statements to be read before the CSRT in their absence. The reading of a detainee's written statement was the task of The Personal Representative, and this occurred, in one case, with Guleed Hassan Ahmed who did not attend his CSRT and instead sent a statement.[11] When detainees did attend, if required, a translator was typically present to assist the detainee and tribunal members.[12][13] They are given a copy of the unclassified summary of information, and aided by a "Personal Representative".[14] Presence of Observers at CSRTsThe question of the presence of outside, neutral observers at the CSRTs is debated. Murat Kurnaz, an exampleMurat Kurnaz was a young Turk who was born in, and had grown up, in Germany. When captured he was close to being granted German citizenship. He was taken off a tourist bus and detained while on a trip to Pakistan. The tribunal's determination was that there was enough evidence of Kurnaz had ties to terrorism that he should be held as an enemy combatant. Through a bureaucratic slip-up Kurnaz's file was declassifed. During the brief window when it was declassified the Washington Post was able to review all the evidence against him and publish a summary.[15] Joyce Hens Green, a Washington jurist, had been able to review both the classified and unclassified evidence. Green found that Kurnaz's file contained something like 100 pages of documents and reports explaining that German and American investigators could find no evidence whatsoever that Kurnaz had any ties to terrorism. Shortly before his tribunal an unsigned memo had been added to his file concluded he was an al Qaeda member. Green's comment on the memo was that it:
Eugene R. Fidell, a Washington-based expert in military law, said:
CriticsIt has been suggested these CSR Tribunals are inherently flawed. The principal arguments of why they are inadequate to warrant acceptance as "competent tribunal," are: [16][17]
Some specific cases that call attention to what critics assert is a flawed nature of the CSRT procedure: Mustafa Ait Idir, Moazzam Begg, Murat Kurnaz, Feroz Abbasi, and Martin Mubanga. [15] A comment on the matter by legal experts states:
James Crisfield, the legal advisor to the Tribunals, offered his legal opinion, that CSRT "do not have the discretion to determine that a detainee should be classified as a prisoner of war -- only whether the detainee satisfies the definition of "enemy combatant""[19] Determining whether a captive should be classified as a prisoner of war is the purpose of a "competent tribunal." On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Geneva Conventions should be applied, but only Article 3, which does not require a competent tribunal.[20] ResultsThe CSRTs are presently on-going, but specific hearings have resulted in a variety of outcomes. Many detainees are still being detained, others have been released to return to their homeland, and still others have been classified and cleared for release but remain at Guantanamo Bay and in U.S. custody because their home countries cannot assure their safety.[21] According the to prior Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, The basis of detaining captured enemy combatants is not to punish but, rather, to prevent them from continuing to fight against the United States and its coalition partners in the ongoing global war on terrorism. Detention of captured enemy combatants is both allowed and accepted under international law of armed conflict. [7] 2007 Combatant Status Review Tribunals for 14 "high-value detainees"In a surprise move President George W. Bush announced the transfer of 14 "high-value detainees" from clandestine CIA custody to military custody in Guantanamo in the fall of 2006.[22] Prior to the transfer legal critics had repeatedly stated that the men in covert CIA custody could never be tried because they had been subjected to abusive interrogation techniques, which would invalidate any evidence that flowed from their interrogations. Nevertheless, Bush said the transfer would allow the men, most of whom were considered to be members of the inner circle of al Qaeda's senior leadership, to be tried at Guantanamo Bay using the CSRT procedures. U.S. Judicial Branch AppealsOriginally the Bush Presidency asserted that the captives had no right to appeal.[23] Captives who had "next friends" willing to initiate the habeas corpus process filed appeals before the United States Judicial Branch. Rasul v. Bush was the first appeal to make its way to the Supreme Court of the United States. The creation of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals was a side effect of Rasul v. Bush. Through the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 the United States Congress moved to first limit, and then completely curtail the captive's ability to file habeas corpus appeals.[23] The Supreme Court ruled on the outstanding habeas corpus appeals in Al Odah v. United States andBoumediene v. Bush, discussed below. The Military Commission Act does provide a process where captives can appeal the Combatant Status Review Tribunal had properly followed OARDEC's own rules when it confirmed their enemy combatant status.[23] If and when captives are able to file these appeals they would be heard before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Emma Schwartz, in the US News and World Report, on August 30, 2007, reported that her sources told her: "...Up to one fourth of the department's own civil appellate staff has recently opted out of handling the government's cases against detainee appeals."[23] Several amalgamated cases have been initiated in the DC Circuit Court.[24] There is controversy over whether the Appeal Court will have access to all the evidence against the captives. As of May 2008 none of the cases has actually come to the point where the judges would consider the merits of the case. Supreme Court rulingOn June 12, 2008 the Supreme Court ruled, 5-4, that Guantanamo captives were entitled to access the US justice system.[25][26][27][28] Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in the majority opinion:
The Court also ruled that the Combatant Status Review Tribunals were "inadequate".[25] Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, David Souter and John Paul Stevens joined Kennedy in the majority. Chief Justice John Roberts, in the minority report, called the CSR Tribunals[25]:
Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia joined Roberts in the dissent.[26] Vincent Warren, the executive director of the Center for Constitutional Rights, the organization that initiated the action that triggered the Supreme Court ruling responded[28]:
See also
Notes
External links
| |